The disposition effect is a well-established phenomenon which describes the behavior of investors that are more willing to sell capital gains than capital losses. In this article we present experimental evidence on a situation where an investor decides on behalf of another person.
Introduction
The disposition effect is a trading pattern characterized by investors that are reluctant to sell capital losses and realize capital gains early (Shefrin and Statman, 1985) . The phenomenon is empirically well-documented for private investors (Odean, 1998; Frazzini, 2006) (Rau, 2015) . Indeed, the disposition effect is not only widespread it is also detrimental for investors (Odean, 1998 ).
Due to this importance a better understanding of the influencing factors of this phenomenon is crucial. There is evidence that disposition effects occur as a result of a combination of refer- Summers and Duxbury (2012) reveal that such a behavior is amplified by reference-dependent emotions. That is, investors keep capital losses to avoid the feeling of regret when realizing that they invested in a disadvantageous stock. By contrast, if stocks exceed the purchase price, risk-averse investors quickly realize them (Shefrin and Statman, 1985) . In this case, Summers and Duxbury (2012) find that rejoicing additionally stimulates the realization of capital gains. Overall, it turns out that disposition effects in particular occur as a result of self-control problems (Shefrin and Statman, 1985) .
Laboratory experiments are appropriate instruments to test how institutional interventions can help to overcome self-control problems. There is evidence that automatic stop-loss orders (Weber and Camerer, 1998; Fischbacher et al., 2017) or the salient presentation of purchase prices (Frydman and Rangel, 2014) can attenuate the emergence of disposition effects. Another form of intervention which might impact disposition effects is 'trading on behalf of others. ' The analysis of social trading is of importance, as private investors frequently delegate their decisions to professional traders (Garvey and Murphy, 2004) . There is evidence that private investors with a low financial literacy are more likely to rely on family and friends (Van Rooij et al., 2011) . The increasing popularity of delegated private investment choices is E peri e tal e ide e G eez a d Potters,
; Fell er a d Sutter, also supports the idea thatopi loss a ersio atters i i est e t de isio s, i.e., ore i for atio a d ore fle i ilit result i lo er risk-taki g eha ior of i estors. Another factor is an investor's perceived social concern for her client. There is evidence that social distance to the decision target is an important determinant for investment behavior when deciding on behalf of others (Motinari and Rancan, 2013 ) and can be detrimental in social trading (Hershfield and Kramer, 2017) . This emphasizes the disposition effects, if private investors trade with their friends' money. A related case is s by Rau (2015) , who finds that responsibility for trading increases the disposition effects in teams.
Our study experimentally builds on the idea that social concerns for others are detrimental for investors' performance in social trading. We study the impact of subjects' social value orientation (prosocial type vs. individualistic type) on the emergence of disposition effects when deciding for others. Our experiments also control for additional factors which might affect disposition effects, such as loss aversion and trade experience. Recent findings of Andersson et al. (2014) suggest that deciding for others lowers loss aversion when choosing between lotteries in a price-list design. We test whether a different degree of perceived loss aversion in social trading affects disposition effects. Importantly, in our experiment we isolate the effects caused by monetary incentives or reputational concerns. Investors are matched to an anonymous client and the decision-makers' payment does not depend on their trading performance.
Our setup minimizes reputational concerns as decision targets do not select the investors and are not informed of their performance before the experiment is finished. To analyze the effect of trading on behalf of others, we conduct two treatments based on the design of Weber and Camerer (1998) . In the main treatment called 'Responsibility,' each subject is randomly matched with an anonymous other subject. All participants repeatedly take investment decisions on behalf of others and know that their profits depend only on the performance of another participant who is also trading on their behalf.
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Our control treatment ('Individual') is an exact replication of Weber and Camerer (1998), i.e., investors trade only for their own benefits.
The results reveal that disposition effects are significantly higher in the Responsibility treatment. Furthermore, our findings show that the treatment effect can be entirely explained by differences in investors' social value orientation. It turns out that inexperienced investors, characterized by a prosocial attitude face self-control problems when taking decisions for others. The data show that this group exhibits a significantly higher disposition effect in social trading as compared to the case when trading for own benefits. By contrast, no treatment effect can be observed for individualists. The results add interesting new insights into the behavior of private traders who trade on behalf of their friends or are part of investment clubs.
Hypotheses
In this section we derive our hypotheses. Experimental evidence of team investment decisions demonstrate that payoff externalities enhance self-control problems, if trading also affects the payoff of a matched partner. Rau (2015) shows that teams of two investors are reluctant to sell capital losses. Empirical evidence of a social-trading platform suggests that reputational effects induce higher disposition effects for traders who are followed by others (Pelster and Hofmann, 2017) . In our Responsibility treatment, where subjects only trade for the benefit of another matched person, we expect that prosocial investors should be affected by this condition. The reason is that these traders have a low perceived social distance to the decision target (Montinari and Rancan, 2013 ) and therefore should have increased problems in regulating their emotions (Hershfield and Kramer, 2017) . Hence, we expect that disposition effects are more pronounced when traders are responsible for other persons. To study trading on behalf of others in isolation, we followed Andersson et al. (2014) and refrained from situations where a monetary conflict of interest exists between the investor and the stakeholder.
Empirical and experimental evidence reveals that individual loss aversion stimulates disposition effects (Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Rau, 2014) . Thus, we expect that subjects with a higher degree of loss aversion realize fewer capital losses and exhibit more pronounced disposition effects. Andersson et al. (2014) report that subjects behave less loss-averse when deciding for others. In Responsibility, investors trade on behalf of others. As trades do not affect their income, they should have a different perception of losses in this case. Hence, the correlation between loss aversion and disposition effects should be less pronounced in Responsibility.
Hypothesis 2:
(a) Individual loss aversion is positively correlated with disposition effects. (b) In Responsibility, the impact of loss aversion on disposition effects is attenuated.
Experimental design
In this section we describe our experimental design. First, the experiment design of Weber and Camerer (1998) is introduced. Second, we discuss the differences between our treatments Individual and Responsibility. Third, we provide a brief overview of the additional experimental tasks implemented to measure individual preferences (risk aversion, loss aversion, and social value orientation) and personal characteristics.
The framework of Weber and Camerer
In the experimental framework of Weber and Camerer (1998) six different labeled assets A, B, C, D, E, and F can be traded over 14 periods. The asset prices are predetermined for all periods and follow a distinct random process. Participants' trading actions do not influence stock prices. The price sequences of all 14 periods are pre-determined before the experiment starts. The stocks are classified in different types according to their chances of a price increase. More precisely, exactly one stock follows a good/very good quality (labeled: +, ++), one stock follows a poor/very poor quality (labeled: −, − −), and two stocks fluctuated around the starting price with a 50% probability of rising prices (labeled: 0). Subjects were told about the existence of the types and their characteristics, but received no information on the allocation of the labels. Our experiment applied the same stocks (A to F), the same allocation of the stock types, and the same price sequences as in Weber and Camerer (1998) . In each period, prices are determined in two stages: 1. determination of the direction of price movement; 2.
determination of the change in the price magnitude. The two stages are explained in detail in the following sections.
Stage 1: Determination of the Direction of Price Movement
In the first stage the computer determines whether an asset will increase/decrease in value.
The probability of a price increase/decrease depends on the assets' stock types. Weber and Camerer's (1998) random process allocates fixed probabilities of stock price increases/decreases for each type of each quality. This feature allows the predetermination of the sequence of the price changes. A random process determines whether a stock will increase or decrease in value. This depends on the underlying probabilities of price increases of the stock types. Although the participants are familiarized with the probabilities of a price increase or decrease, they do not know which probability belongs to which stock. Nevertheless, the participants can guess by counting and comparing the number of price increases in the previous periods. Table 1 presents the underlying allocation of the stocks (A to F) to the types. Our experiment follows Weber and Camerer (1998) and adopts their design. 
Stage 2: Determination of the Price Magnitude
After the random process determines whether an asset will increase, the computer randomly determines the magnitude of the price change in the second stage. It can be either 1, 3 or 5
Talers. All outcomes occur with a probability of one third. The probability of a stock price increase is not correlated with the magnitude of the price change and the expected value of a price change for a randomly-chosen stock is zero (Weber and Camerer, 1998 ).
sented to subjects prior to the start of the experiment. The purpose is to give participants an initial idea of the stocks' characteristics. In this experiment we also present this information to subjects prior to the start of the experiment. Figure 1 illustrates the resulting stock movements of Weber Camerer (1998) in periods -3 to 14. 
Elicitation of Guess Scores
In the experiment we follow Weber and Camerer (1998) to examine the possibility that subjects' disposition effects are caused by a misjudgment of the stock types. That is, after periods 7 and 14 subjects must guess the type of each of the six stocks. The estimates are used to derive delta (δ), a measure of fit between the best fit and a subject's guess of the stock type. The guesses of the six stocks are coded as follows: ++ = 2, + = 1, 0 = 0, − = -1, − − = -2. The coding corresponds to the rational estimate. Afterwards, the absolute value of the difference between a subject's guess and the rational estimate is calculated for each of the six stocks. The delta corresponds to the sum of the absolute differences of all six stocks. The δ measure ranges from 0 (best estimates) to 12 (worst estimates). For instance, if a subject guesses that the ++-type is stock 'F' then the subject's actual estimate equals the rational estimate. Thus, the difference is: 2−2 = 0. If the subject guesses that the 0-type is stock 'A' then the difference is:
1−0 = 1. It follows for the delta of this subject: δ = 0 + 1+ etc. 
Measures of the Disposition Effect
When investors sell shares, the purchase prices are not always known. Hence, the paper reports two accounting principles to compute results: (i) Average Price; (ii) First-In-First-Out (FIFO). 4 The Average-Price approach (e.g., Odean, 1998) determines the purchase price as the weighted average of all purchase prices. Whereas, the FIFO measure identifies the purchase prices by assuming that investors sell the stocks in distinct orders. That is, it assumes that investors first sell the stocks which were bought first.
Furthermore, the analysis follows Odean (1998) to investigate the occurrence of disposition effects. Therefore, we determine the proportion of gains realized (PGR) and the proportion of losses realized (PLR). The PGR (PLR) is the number of realized gains (losses) divided by the total number of possible gains (losses) that could have been sold. In accordance with Odean (1998), it can be defined as follows:
We calculated the individual-level disposition effects (DE) for all participants as the difference between the PGR and PLR:
The DE measure is restricted to a range between -1 and 1. Participants with DE = 1 (-1) realized all gains (losses) immediately, whereas they never realized losses (gains). For investors with DE = 0, PGR and PLR are equal.
We also compute disposition effects with the measure of Weber and Camerer (1998) to provide a robustness check for the DE measure. We refer to this measure as the 'alpha' measure.
Alpha examines whether participants used last period's prices as reference points. More precisely, it is tested whether subjects prefer to sell stocks after price increases of the last period's price. The alpha measure is defined as: 4 We also calculated LIFO (Last-In-First-Out) but results are not affected by using this accounting principle. Weber and Camerer (1998) and Rau (2015) also find no differences between these accounting principles. (4) ( ) represents the sum of sales realized after price increases (decreases). Alpha corresponds to the difference in sales after a price increase and a price decrease, normalized by the total number of sales. An alpha of 1 (-1) indicates that participants only sold after the price increased (decreased) . If the alpha amounts to zero, the number of sells after price increases and price decreases is the same.
Individual versus Responsibility Treatment
In a between-subject design, we test for differences between the two treatments: Individual and Responsibility. Individual is identical to the experiment of Weber and Camerer (1998) as well as Rau (2015) . It follows the framework described in section 3. 
Procedures of the Individual treatment
In Individual all participants received an endowment of 10,000 Talers. In both treatments we applied an exchange rate of 1,000 Taler = €1. In periods 1 to 13 (see Figure 1 ) subjects could buy or sell assets which were labeled with the neutral German word 'Anteile' (''shares").
Subjects did not necessarily have to invest any amount of their endowment. There were no transaction costs for trading actions and subjects were not allowed to make short sales, i.e., they could only sell stocks which they owned. In period 14 subjects' portfolios were automatically liquidated. Their final payoff corresponded to the value of the liquidated portfolio plus the money they owned in period 14. To evaluate whether subjects had a good understanding of the stock types, they had to guess the stock types after periods 7 and 14. Here, they received 200 Talers (€0.20) for each correct guess.
Responsibility
In Responsibility almost everything was identical to Individual. However, one crucial difference was that a trader decided on behalf of someone else and her outcome of the trading experiment also depended on the decisions of someone else. To establish this treatment environment, all participants acted in the role of an investor and recipient. More precisely, subjects determined with their trading actions the payoff of a randomly matched recipient. At the same time, they received a payoff which depended on the trading performance of another randomly matched participant. Our matching procedure ruled out that two subjects could mutually generate their payoffs. We explicitly informed our subjects on this matching procedure which prevents participants from evolving any kind of reciprocal mental connection to their matched partner. At the beginning of the experiment every participant received a note containing a letter from the alphabet attached to the instructions. Participants made aware that the letter served as their experimental identity. 6 Afterwards, participants were told in the instructions that they had to decide for another participant in the experimental session and that their earnings from the experiment would depend on someone else. When the trading experiment started, participants received a screen message informing them of the letter of the participant which they would be deciding for. Moreover, they were shown another letter of the person who would be deciding for them. We informed participants in the decision sheet of each period that they would decide on behalf of the matched recipient. Therefore, we again mentioned that they would be making their decisions on behalf of this participant.
Additional experimental tasks
Besides the main trading experiment, we conducted further elicitation tasks. Before the trading experiment started, a computerized risk-aversion, loss-aversion and social value orientation elicitation task was conducted. Finally, after the trading experiment had been carried out, subjects' empathy, levels of perceived regret, and rejoice were elicited in a post-experimental questionnaire.
To elicit risk aversion, we carried out a modified version of the measure, introduced by Eckel and Grossman (EG; Eckel and Grossman, 2008). In the EG task participants chose a preferred lottery from a set of lotteries. The classical form of the EG, however, allows us to measure detailed distinctions exclusively for different levels of risk aversion. We therefore decided to extend the classical EG task to gather additional information on whether participants were risk-neutral or risk-seeking. 7 In a next step we elicited subjects' loss aversion through an incentivized multiple price list, For detailed illustration of the conducted task and possible outcomes of the lotteries, please refer to appendix A.1. To determine the payoff, the chosen lottery was performed and the outcome was paid to the participant at the end of the experimental session. 8 The modified design of the GJH-task is adapted from Rau (2014) and can be found in appendix A.2. 9 The monetary amounts used in the tasks were chosen according to an average wage approach: average wage per time unit multiplied by the expected time units to carry out the task. 10 The randomly assigned participant was not the same as in the stock trading experiment.
their own decisions and the other half received a monetary amount depending on the decision of the randomly matched 'decider.'
In addition, we measured subjects' empathy using a 16-item questionnaire answered on a 5-point Likert scale. 11 The empathy measure is based on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI), introduced by Davis (1983) . We used a modified version according to Paulus (2012) .
To calculate the empathy score of a participant the 5-point Likert scale was transformed into numbers. If participants chose the response 'never' the corresponding number was 1, if they chose 'rarely' the number was 2, and so on. The empathy score is the sum of the 16 items minus the numbers from items 3, 6, 8, and 13.
Results
In this section, we start with descriptive statistics on trading behavior in our two treatments.
Afterwards, we apply non-parametric and parametric-test methods to validate our hypotheses.
All reported tests are based on two-sided p-values, if not otherwise specified. Whereas the variables processed gains, gain trades, and loss trades focus on the average number of processed trades.
Trading Behavior
A conspicuous finding is that investors in both treatments sell a significantly higher average number of capital gains than capital losses (Wilcoxon matched pairs tests, p < 0.001; both treatments). A similar pattern can be found when focusing on gain and loss trades. This is a first indication that disposition effects obviously occur in both treatments. We find that in
Responsibility not statistically significant more stocks are bought and more capital gains and losses are sold than in Individual.
11
The translation of the items is provided in appendix A.4. 
Hypotheses tests
We turn to our main results. (2011) point out that investors with low trading experience especially have problems in the regulation of emotions. Therefore, we distinguish between the SVO of less-experienced traders and more-experienced traders. Focusing on trading experience, it turns out that 54% of our subjects stated that they had very low trading experience of 1. Therefore, we classify subjects with a trading experience of 1 (>1) as inexperienced (experienced).
Focusing on experienced traders, we do not find that social-value orientation statistically significantly determines the level of disposition effects in Responsibility (Pearson's correlation coefficient, ρ = -0.223; p = 0.178).
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By contrast, we observe that the level of perceived social distance clearly matters for inexperienced traders. This finding is illustrated in Figure 4 which presents scatter plots of the correlation between subjects' SVO angle and the level of exhibited disposition effects. In the scatter plots data of the treatment Responsibility (left panel) and treatment Individual (right panel) is compared. A conspicuous finding is that in Responsibility we find a significant positive correlation between subjects with a higher degree of social-value orientation (i.e., a higher SVO angle) and the level of exhibited disposition effects. We interpret these subjects in Responsibility as in- 
Result 2a: When inexperienced investors are responsible for other people, prosocial types exhibit significantly higher disposition effects than individualistic types.

Result 2b: When inexperienced investors are responsible for other people, the level of investors' social-value orientation determines the level of disposition effects.
Finally, we analyze whether deciding on behalf of others impacts the degree of perceived loss aversion which might affect the occurrence of disposition effects. Focusing on the aggregate data, we generally find that disposition effects are stimulated by loss aversion. That is, we 
Result 3a: Loss aversion stimulates the occurrence of disposition effects.
Result 3b: The relation between loss aversion and disposition effects is attenuated in the Responsibility treatment.
The results show that though deciding on behalf of others attenuates the impact of loss aversion on disposition effects, traders do not achieve an improved performance in this setting.
However, our analysis of the impact of social-value orientation provides an answer: As it turns out, prosocial investors who perceive a lower distance to their matched person exhibit particularly high disposition effects.
Regression Analyses
To provide an in-depth analysis of disposition effects, we estimate OLS regressions on DE, PGR, and PLR realized by subjects. Table 3 illustrates the regression estimates for the three dependent variables DE (models 1-2), PGR (models 2-3), and PLR (models 4-5). In regressions (1), (3) , and (5) we include a treatment dummy (Responsibility) and subjects' preference parameters (loss aversion and risk aversion). Models (2), (4) , and (6) Math grade (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) To better understand the driving forces of the treatment differences in disposition effects, we focus on subjects' selling behavior in more detail. In this respect, we run separate regressions on the Proportion of Gains Realized (PGR) (models 3-4) and on the Proportion of Losses Realized (PLR) (models 5-6). It becomes obvious from models (3) and (5) that the treatment effect is mainly caused by an increased PGR in the Responsibility treatment. More precisely, in the Responsibility treatment we find more PGR. This is highlighted by Model (3) which focuses on subjects' PGR as dependent variable. Here, we find that the coefficient of Responsibility is positive and significant. Thus, when participants decide on behalf of another person, they reveal a more pronounced tendency to realize capital gains, compared to the situation where they trade for their own benefit. Furthermore, the degree of loss aversion is a key driver of PLR (see Model (5)). That is, a higher degree of loss aversion leads to a smaller PLR.
If we ignore subjects' social value orientation (models (1), (3), (5) 
The role of investor motivation
A further possible explanation for the treatment effect could be differences in investors' motivation to trade, as their performance in Responsibility will be revealed to a matched partner (Pelster and Hofmann, 2017) . We assume that trader motivation could be reflected by the number of trades processed, as trading is associated with effort. Besides the first indications from Table 2 regarding the trading volume, we provide a more detailed overview of the trading volume. Table 4 focuses on the data of the Responsibility treatment. It illustrates the trading volume of traders with high and low trading experience in the Responsibility treatment. The table compares trading volume based on subjects' trading experience (columns 1-3) and based on the SVO of subjects with low trading experience (columns 4-5).
It becomes obvious that the total trading volume does not differ between the different levels of trading experience. A conspicuous finding can be observed when focusing on the trading volume of subjects based on their SVO. That is, prosocial inexperienced subjects even process a weakly significant higher trading volume of capital gains (67.4) compared to individualistic subjects (31.8) (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.083). This underlines the finding that the significant treatment effect of the PGR only arises because prosocial traders with low trading experience process a higher trading volume. Hence, we find that this group is even more motivated when trading on behalf of others. stock types. In the Weber and Camerer (1998) framework subjects know that each of the six stocks follows a distinct type, i.e., stocks with a better rating are more likely to increase. As a consequence, subjects have the possibility to identify a stock's type by counting the number of stock price increases/decreases. Our idea is that, if an investor is motivated to achieve a good performance, she should therefore try to find out the stocks' characteristics. Subjects' evaluations of the stock types are measured by the guess score we elicited in the experiment.
It turns out that Mann-Whitney tests focusing on the guess scores after period 7 and 14 find no significant differences between experienced and inexperienced investors (period 7: p = 0.371; period 14: p = 0.210). The same holds when comparing guess scores between prosocial vs. individualistic subjects (period 7: p = 0.761; period 14: p = 0.316). This adds further support against the idea that inexperienced prosocial investors exhibit more pronounced disposition effects because of a lack of motivation.
Result 5: The higher disposition effect of inexperienced traders with prosocial value orientation in Responsibility is not driven by less motivation of these individuals.
Conclusion
This paper analyzes the disposition effect of investors who decide on behalf of other subjects.
A special interest was whether prosocial investors in this case exhibit more pronounced disposition effects, as they feel closer to the other person. We explored this research question experimentally, as this enables us to tackle possible obstacles which are hard to isolate in the field. First, the setup allows us to focus on the pure effects of intrinsic motivation from the investors' side. That is, the experimental framework of a Responsibility treatment avoids by design that extrinsic motives from the investors' side could be a reason for behavioral changes in social trading. More precisely, as investors in Responsibility are not paid based on their trading performance, it can be ruled out that they strive for a (high) own monetary benefit.
Moreover, we exogenously match the decision targets to the investors. Thus, it cannot be that investors have extrinsic motives to attract traders that are following them. The latter can play an important role in online social trading platforms where 'leading' traders receive bonuses for each trader who decides to copy their trades (Pelster and Hofmann, 2017).
The results support our hypothesis, i.e., we observe stronger disposition effects when investors' trading decisions affect the payoff of other subjects. More concrete, inexperienced traders with a prosocial attitude more readily sell capital gains when taking decisions for others.
By contrast, no treatment effect can be found for individualistic subjects and decision-makers with a high degree of trading experience. We find that deciding on behalf of others abolishes the correlation of individual loss aversion and the disposition effect (Andersson et al., 2014) which, however, has no effect on treatment differences. We focus on a couple of robustness checks on investors' trading volume and their understanding of the stock types to proxy their motivation when deciding for others. However, we find no evidence that inexperienced investors in the Responsibility treatment could be less motivated. That is, no differences in trading volume or between the precision of guess scores can be found for the different trader types.
The results are exciting, as we can conclude that even intrinsic motives (which may be shared by friends) are sufficient to cause pronounced disposition effects when deciding for others. It is noteworthy that social distance in our anonymous design should rather be less distinctive. 
A.1 Eckel and Grossman task
In this part you have to choose one of 9 lotteries which you prefer most. After your decision the computer will perform your selected lottery. Both payoffs arise with a probability of 50%.
At the end of the experiment you will be informed of the outcome of the draw. 
A.2 Gächter et al. task
You receive an endowment of 70 cents for this part. In the following you are faced with 10 lotteries. Assume that for each of the 10 questions a coin is thrown. The coin can either land at 'heads' or 'tail.' To answer each of the 10 questions you will either have to choose 'accept'
or 'reject' taking part in the respective lottery. After you submit your decisions the computer will randomly draw one of the lotteries. If you reject this specific lottery you will receive the endowment after the experiment. If you accept the randomly chosen lottery the computer will flip a coin and the outcome of this coin toss will be added to your endowment. At the end of the experiment you will be informed of the randomly selected lottery and the outcome of the draw. 
A.4 Questionnaire for measuring empathy
You will now read several statements which describe specific (generalized) Welcome to this experiment about decision making. Please read these instructions to the experiment carefully.
At the beginning of the experiment, every participant will receive a slip of paper with a letter on it (e.g. 'B' or 'U). These letters are assigned randomly and the alphabetic order is not linked to the numbers of the cabins.
In the main part of the experiment you will decide for someone else. This other participant is randomly assigned to you by the computer and the person will remain anonymous during and after the experiment. The only information available to you is the randomly assigned letter.
Furthermore, you are also assigned to another participant who decides for you.
Note: The participant who decides for you is not the same person as the person you are deciding for.
For the main experiment:
 Your decisions do not have any consequences for your payoff. However, your decisions have direct consequences for the payoff of the randomly assigned participant.
 Your payoff depends on the decisions of the randomly assigned participant. This participant decides for you and is not the participant you are deciding for.
Before the experiment starts, you are informed about the anonymous name (i.e., the letter) of the person for whom you take your decisions. Moreover, you are informed about the name (i.e., the letter) of the person who decides for you.
[Instructions of the control treatment only start at this paragraph]
During the experiment you will earn Talers which are converted to Euros by the following exchange-rate:
1,000 Talers = €1
At the end of the experiment, the assigned participant whose payoff depends on your decisions will receive your Taler earnings converted in € and you will receive the amount the other participant earned for you in Euros. You will be informed about the earnings of the assigned participant at the end of the experiment before you are paid.
After the experiment, please wait at your desk until we will ask you to come to get your payoff. The payment is anonymous. Thus you will not get information about payments of other participants or their assigned letter. Please notice that it is not allowed to talk during the experiment. If you will talk to other persons, the experiment will be aborted immediately. If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come to your desk to answer it privately.
Description of the experiment
The experiment consists of 14 periods. In every period you have the possibility to buy shares of the firms A, B, C, D, E, and F. Every share has a certain value in Talers in every period.
You start the experiment with an endowment of 10,000 Talers.
Performance of shares
The shares A-F will change in prices at the beginning of each of the 14 periods, i.e., in the subsequent period there will be no share which will have the same price as in the previous period. The share-price changes have been predetermined before the experiment started. That is, all price changes of all shares are completely independent of all your buying and selling decisions. The same is true for all buying and selling decisions of the other participants of the experiment. Each of the shares A-F is of a certain type. The share types differ regarding their probability of increasing (decreasing) in value at the beginning of the period. The distributions of the types are given in the table below. In the experiment there will be exactly one share (of the shares A-F) which follows type '++' and the same is true for one share of type '+', '-', and '--'. There will be two types (of the shares A-F) which follow type '0'. All types are displayed at the below table.
Shares in the market Example:
 Assume that share X is of type: '++'
 At the beginning of each period the probability of a price increase of X is: 65%
 At the beginning of each period the probability of a price decrease of X is: 35%
The share price is determined as follows:
1. At the beginning of each period a share either increases (decreases). The probability depends on the share's type (see table) .
2. Furthermore, the magnitude of the price movement (increase/decrease) will be determined. The magnitude of the price movement can either be of 1, 3 or 5 Talers.
Every magnitude (1, 3 or 5 Talers) can happen with the same probability. That is, every magnitude (1, 3 or 5 Talers) can happen with a probability of one-third. This is the same for every share, independent of its type.
Buying and selling actions of shares
In each of the 14 periods you have the possibility to buy and sell shares for the portfolio of the other participant. You will find a screen shot at the next page which depicts all of your decision possibilities in the course of the experiment. In the upper part you will find the share price window, displaying shares A-F. The price changes of shares A-F in periods 1-14 will be displayed here. To give you an idea of shares' past price changes, you will also find the prices of periods -3, -2, -1 and 0. In the following you are given an overview of the price changes of the shares A-F in the periods -3, -2, -1 and 0.
Possibilities of decisions in the experiment
The upper part of the window is the share price window:
 The array labeled 'price' displays the exact price of a share in the current period. For instance, in the screen shot share A had a price of 76 Talers in period -3.
 Furthermore, the array 'Bought/sold' displays the number of bought/sold shares in the current period. The screen uses the following symbols: '--' which means that there was no transaction. '1' which means that one share was bought. '-1' which means that one share was sold.
The window at the bottom is the transaction window. Here, you can decide in each period whether you would like to buy/sell one or more shares of shares A-F.
 The array 'number owned' displays the current number of shares owned  The array 'current price' depicts the price which has to be paid in order to buy new shares. At the same time you would receive this price for each share sold. 
Additional earnings and payoff
Additional earnings
Before the main experiment begins, you have the possibility to earn additional money by carrying out three tasks. The instructions for the tasks are displayed on the computer screen respectively.
After the three tasks are carried out the main experiment starts (instructions in written form).
In the main experiment, you have to submit guesses on the stock typs. This happens after the end of period 7 and after the end of period 14. Here, you have to guess which stock A-F followed the types:'++', '+', '0', '--'and '-'. You will be credited 200 Talers to your endowment for every correct guess.
Payoff
The total payoff you will earn in the experiment is calculated as follows:
Total payoff = endowment which was not invested by the participant who decides for you + value of the shares in the portfolio of this participant + earnings of your guesses + your earnings from the three additional tasks.
The total payoff of the participant on behalf of which you are deciding will earn in the experiment:
Total payoff = your endowment which was not invested + value of the shares in your portfolio + earnings of this participants guesses + earnings of this participant from the three additional tasks.
